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# Leibniz and Schelling

By

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## Zusammenfassung

Leibniz wie Schelling entwickelten im Laufe ihres Lebens sich verändernde philosophische Überzeugungen – im folgenden sind Leibniz' jeweilige Positionen an Schellings Zeitachse verankert: Er hielt Leibniz zunächst für Kants ‚enantiomorphes‘ Bild – einen empirischen Idealisten und objektiven/transzendentalen Realisten (für die *Vernunft*, nicht für den *Verstand*; vgl. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*: A 11-12, 293-298, B 25, 349-355), Dogmatiker im Kantschen Sinne. Indem er sich auf Leibniz' *Monadologie* bezog und deren wesentlichen Kern – daß alles absolut in seiner Singularität und singular als Absolutes ist – zuspitzte, gestaltete Schelling diesen Gedanken zum Schlüssel nicht nur hinsichtlich des Zugangs zur Philosophie absoluter Identität, sondern auch für manche Aspekte seiner Naturphilosophie: Schellings metaphysische Deutungen von Gravitation und Kohäsion, Licht, Raum und Zeit berührten hier Leibniz'sche Positionen. Nach Hegels schonungslosem Angriff auf ihn und dem erforderlich gewordenen Neubeginn trat die *Monadologie* für Schelling als ‚*lusus ingenii*‘ – die Monaden und deren Körper waren so ‚geistig‘ wie ihre Vorstellungen – stärker in den Hintergrund, und er wandte sich nun eher Leibnizens *Théodicée* zu. Bestimmte Stellen in Schellings späteren Arbeiten zeigen, daß ihm Leibniz' Denken ständig gegenwärtig blieb: Noch seine letzte Schrift, die *Abhandlung über die Quelle der ewigen Wahrheiten*, behandelte ein Problem aus Leibnizens *Théodicée*.

To relate the philosophy of Leibniz to that of Schelling cannot be to relate one fixed position to another, because the positions of both evolved. Here we relate the position of Leibniz to the chronology of Schelling, which contained a major change in relation to Leibniz. Leibniz's small treatises and correspondence are really essays, with particular ends in view; Schelling's works were longer and, even in his early philosophies of nature, were consciously artistic productions which, even when chronologically close, varied considerably in form, even while the contents were cognate. When handling the thought of others he relied on insight and artistry to reduce it to an overall characteristic, about which he was often strongly critical. He was certainly very critical of Leibniz, but took his thought continually into account from the beginning to the end of his career. He was prepared to give a greater universality to matters which Leibniz had expressed briefly in his treatises, and for that reason, unlike many since, was not querulous about the fragmentary quality of those works: he also had too much respect for the thought itself. With the example of Kant before him, he fell in at first with the tradition that regarded Leibniz's *Monadologie* as his key work, and presumed that the position that the reality of things are simple substances, or monads, in comparison with which material things are really phenomena, was Leibniz's final, unequivocal and therefore true posi-

tion<sup>1</sup>. But neither Kant<sup>2</sup> (whose view he took seriously) nor he agreed with it. To uphold his consistency, Leibniz was, and even now is, presumed to have sanctioned a retrospective re-interpretation of material and bodies, as pure phenomena; though, now as then, some feel uneasy about this.

#### Schelling's earliest classification of Leibniz's thought

Schelling's philosophy was born within the interrelationships he had made from within his overall characterisations of the other great philosophers. His *Über die Möglichkeit einer Form der Philosophie überhaupt* (1794) and *Vom Ich als Princip der Philosophie* (1795) were I-centred philosophies, not following Fichte (as is normally supposed), but correcting him and going much further than him, and, in the light of that reinterpretation, synthesising with it a more essential systematic reinterpretation of Kant's transcendental aesthetic. In the latter work the I is absolute and unconditional; all other reality takes up a position in relationship to the I as absolute, and takes from it "eine übergetra-

- 1 It emerged through publication of his later correspondence, especially in *Recueil de diverses pièces, sur la philosophie, la religion naturelle, l'histoire, les mathématiques, etc., par Mrs. Leibniz, Clarke, Newton et autres auteurs célèbres*. Publié par P. DesMaizeaux, 2 vols., Amsterdam <sup>1</sup>1720, <sup>2</sup>1740, and contrasted with innumerable previous texts which saw bodies as having physical properties. In the search for consistency one theory supposes that he gives a scientific account of vision. Even within his phenomenalism there are discrepancies. Their reality is "in percipientium secum ipsis" (letter to de Volder, 30 June 1704; GP II, 270). To other correspondents they were "phenomenes, mais bien fondés" (letter to Remond, 10 Jan 1714; GP III, 605-608, here 606 (first published in DesMaizeaux); the Abbé Conti, 6 Dec 1715, in: C. I. Gerhardt (Hrsg.): *Der Briefwechsel von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz mit Mathematikern*, Bd. 1 (vol. 2 never appeared), Berlin 1899, pp. 263-267, here 265 (first published in DesMaizeaux). Yet in adjusting his monadic theory to transsubstantiation he wrote to père des Bosses S. J. that without the monads as a "substantiale vinculum" there would be "nihil aliud [...] quam" well-founded phenomena (letter of 5 Feb 1712; GP II, 435). That this hypothesis became more insistent just before and after his *Monadologie* and *Principes de la nature et de la grace, fondés en raison* (both of 1714) suggests that it was a counterpart to reducing reality to monads as simple substances. However, the recent publication of much earlier personal papers with such expressions (H. Breger) suggests it had long been a personal esoteric position: (a) "Corpora sunt apparitiones cohaerentes" ("Calculus ratiocinator" (early 1679?); A VI, 4A, 279); (b) "[...] corpus omne fore tantum phaenomenon reale, quale est Iris" ("Divisio terminorum ac enumeratio attributorum" (between 1683 and 1685?); A VI, 4A, 559).
- 2 With Leibniz's final position in mind, Kant had interpreted him as making substances "einfache Subjecte, mit Vorstellungskräften begabt, mit einem Worte *Monaden*" (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*: A 266, B 322; cf. A 283-284, B 339-340), which "den Grundstoff des ganzen Universum ausmachen sollen" (A 274, B 330). Kant considered whether the monad could be the 'Ding an sich', and decided against it. Kant retained Leibniz's term 'substantia noumen' for it, but detached it from the unacceptable monad-reality. The other element of Leibniz's final position: matter as 'substantia phaenomenon', which became Kant's 'Phaenomena', derives from Leibniz's description of matter.

*gene* (gleichsam geliehene) *Substantialität*”<sup>3</sup>. Only now, he says, “nachdem der Begriff von Nicht-Ich im Gegensatz gegen das absolute Ich bestimmbar ist”, is it possible to give idealism and realism their proper meaning<sup>4</sup>. And in this context, and with a reference (basically) to Kant’s contrast between criticism and dogmatism, and his division between empirical and transcendental idealism and realism<sup>5</sup>, he imposed a composite classification on Leibniz’s thought in contrast to the corresponding (enantiomorphic) self-characterisation of Kant’s own: a logical pairing, but both surpassed by reference to the reality of an absolute I – “[...] indem er das Daseyn der äußern Gegenstände als Körper leugnete, dagegen aber das Daseyn eines Nicht-Ichs überhaupt unabhängig vom Ich annahm, in Rücksicht auf jenes empirischer Idealist, in Rücksicht auf dieses reiner, objektiver Realist”<sup>6</sup>. Indeed, said Schelling, Leibniz was, in Kant’s sense, a ‘dogmatist’, because “[er] sieht die Erscheinungen als ebenso viele Einschränkungen der unendlichen Realität des *Nicht-Ichs* an”<sup>7</sup>. For Kant, ‘Dogmatismus’ was “[die] Anmaßung, mit einer reinen Erkenntniß aus Begriffen (der philosophischen) nach Principien, so wie sie die Vernunft längst im Gebrauch hat, ohne Erkundigung der Art und des Rechts, womit sie dazu gelangt ist, allein fortzukommen”<sup>8</sup>. In perfect consistency with this view, Schelling thought that Leibniz had done just this with the conception of God, and had brought an incorrect orientation to its ultimate end:

“Ich glaube, daß mit Leibniz eigentlich das Mittelalter der Philosophie begonnen hat (obgleich die Scholastiker schon den Weg dazu gebahnt hatten), da man nämlich auch in der Philosophie anfang, das Absolute zu einem bloßen Wesen der Abstraktion zu machen, und Gott nicht als das Wesen *aller* Wesen, sondern (populärer Weise) als Wesen *ausser* allen Wesen zu betrachten. Die älteste und heiligste Idee der Philosophie war ohne Zweifel das allem Existirenden zu Grunde liegende unwandelbare Sein. Erst als Spinozas vermeinter Atheism Theologie und Philosophie aufschreckte, nahm man in der Philosophie seine Zuflucht zu einem Gott *ausser* allem Existirenden, dessen Idee nun nichts mehr als ein Compositum allgemeiner Abstraktionen war”<sup>9</sup>.

In so far as Leibniz’s supposed transcendental realism attributed reality to the monads, his position still lacked authentic realism, even by Schelling’s measure of the derivation of real and ideal from the I as absolute reality; and his

3 “Vom Ich als Princip der Philosophie oder über das Unbedingte im menschlichen Wissen” (1795), in: *Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schellings Sämmtliche Werke (SW)*, Bd. I, 1, Stuttgart – Augsburg 1856, pp. 149-244, here 194.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 211.

5 *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, in his critique of the fourth paralogism: A 366-380.

6 “Vom Ich als Princip der Philosophie” (see note 3), pp. 212-213. Kant in fact treats transcendental realism as *objective* realism (contrary to his normal practice): “[...] der transcendente Realismus [sieht] die Gegenstände äußerer Sinne für etwas von den Sinnen selbst Unterschiedenes und bloße Erscheinungen für selbständige Wesen an[...], die sich außer uns befinden [...]” (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*: A 371).

7 “Vom Ich als Princip der Philosophie” (see note 3), p. 215.

8 *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*: B XXXV.

9 Draft letter to Obereit of 12 March, 1796, in: G. L. Plitt (Hrsg.): *Aus Schellings Leben. In Briefen*, Bd. I (1775-1803), Leipzig 1869, p. 88. The latter part contains a theme to which Schelling always returned.

fault in separating God from all other ‘Wesen’, and treating His reality as an abstraction, could be aligned with this position.

Yet Schelling exploited a facility taken from the *Monadologie* at the nodal point of his philosophies of nature and absolute identity

Schelling aligned the principle of multiplicity-in-unity, which he found in the articulation and structuring of Leibniz’s *Monadologie*, with the ancient principle of ἔν καὶ πᾶν, recently given new life by Lessing, and took it far beyond that: far beyond also multiplicities- and dualities-in-unity of Plato and the neo-Platonists. The ἔν must be identified with every reality within the πᾶν, and the collectivity of the πᾶν must be identified with the ἔν. He treated it as a general principle, which could be applied to real and ideal, or both together. He attributed this to Leibniz in his *Fernere Darstellungen*, within an appeal to philosophical tradition: originally united, then broken up into separated themes which he was reuniting.

Specifically in his philosophies of absolute identity, and implicitly in his philosophies of nature<sup>10</sup>, he ‘constructed’ all things in the absolute, in a mode which itself is absolute<sup>11</sup>. Philosophy, he said, does not go outside the absolute, which is the ‘An-sich’ of everything. That entailed not merely that authentic philosophy should relate everything to the absolute, but it should primarily express its “Einheit und ungetheilte Vollkommenheit”, and within this its presence in things, which are determined by it<sup>12</sup>. But that does not forget the enormous variety, even actual chaos, which exists amongst the apparently real – “liegt nicht [...] alles in einer göttlichen Verwirrung vor dir?”<sup>13</sup> It makes up a unity, on which the imposition of divisions and distinctions thought up by the human “Verstand” is in vain. However, a construction which grasped the totality in its unity, which saw everything together in its particularity and its absoluteness, would reveal “die absolute Harmonie des Universums und die Göttlichkeit aller Wesen<sup>14</sup>”. It had always been his intention to make this intelligible, by relating it to the absolute principles from which it derives<sup>15</sup>. The principle themes of a select series of philosophers reflect an original system of wisdom, which are brought back into unity in his philosophy:

“Die vortrefflichsten aller Erkenntnisse werdet ihr leicht unter den Bruchstücken der ältesten Weisheit entdecken; [...]. Diese Quellen fließen für jedermann, und sind doch in wenigen zur Erkenntniß geworden, weil diese nur aus innerer lebendiger Form und im Trieb eigner Kunst geboren wird. [Diese sind] nichts anderes [...] als nach verschiedenen Richtungen verschobene

10 Works of both kinds are listed in note 19.

11 See “*Fernere Darstellungen aus dem System der Philosophie*” (1802), in: *SW I*, 4, Stuttgart – Augsburg 1859, pp. 333-510, here 409.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 407; cf. pp. 397, 409.

13 *Ibid.*, p. 400.

14 *Ibid.*, p. 402.

15 See *ibid.*, p. 400.

Bilder des einzig wahren Systems, das, wie die ewige Natur, weder jung noch alt, und nicht der Zeit, sondern der Natur nach das Erste ist<sup>16</sup>”.

These are the teaching on ideas in Pythagoras and Plato, Heraclitus’s teaching on unity in opposition, Leibniz’s teaching on monads, and Spinoza’s teaching on unity. What he says about Leibniz is most important, and he claims to express its deepest essence:

“Die gedoppelte Einheit aller Dinge, und wie jedes ursprünglich in seiner Besonderheit absolut und in seiner Absolutheit besonder sey, werdet ihr leicht in der Monadenlehre des Leibniz erblicken, deren Ursprung ihr selbst wieder in eine unbestimmbare Ferne verfolgen könnt [...]”<sup>17</sup>.

By Leibniz’s principle of indeterminables, everything – every monad and body – is different, and thereby (absolutely) particular, and Schelling ignores both the imperfection of the monads’ representation of the totality of monads, and the influence from the physical plenum on each body, to attain to the corresponding enantiomorph, that everything as particular is identical with the absolute. Absolute philosophising (not a philosophy *of* the absolute) is the discernment of this double identity:

“[...] die verschiedenen Einheiten haben als verschieden keine Wesenheit an sich, sondern sind nur ideelle Formen und Bilder, unter welchen im absoluten Erkennen das Ganze ausgeprägt wird, und insofern sie in diesem sind, sind sie die ganze Welt selbst, und haben nichts außer sich, mit dem sie verglichen oder dem sie entgegengesetzt werden könnten. – Das ganze Universum ist im Absoluten als Pflanze, als Thier, als Mensch, aber weil in jedem das Ganze ist, so ist es nicht als Pflanze, nicht als Thier, nicht als Mensch oder als die besondere Einheit, sondern als absolute Einheit darin; erst in der Erscheinung, wo es aufhört das *Ganze* zu seyn, die Form etwas für sich seyn will und aus der Indifferenz mit dem Wesen tritt, wird jedes das Besondere und die bestimmte Einheit. – Mit dem Besonderen also, auch der Art nach, ist nichts im Absoluten: es gibt keine Pflanze an sich oder Thier an sich; was wir Pflanze nennen, ist [nicht das Wesen, die Substanz, sondern] bloß Begriff, bloß ideelle Bestimmung, und alle Formen erlangen Realität nur, insofern sie das göttliche Bild der Einheit empfangen; dadurch aber werden sie selbst Universa, und heißen Ideen und hören jede auf eine besondere zu seyn, indem sie sich jener gedoppelten Einheit erfreuen, auf welcher die Absolutheit beruht”<sup>18</sup>.

He safeguarded the dynamism of the whole by fractionally displacing, in different ways, the deepest principles from a total identity with the absolute. So from one direction, the power behind the plurification of those principles left the absolute as absolute in itself, and from the other direction the principles manifested their power in their emulation of the simplicity of the absolute. An authentic understanding of Schelling demands a stereoscopic grasp of this unity and fractional displacement, in what is primarily identical<sup>19</sup>. But the single

16 Ibid., p. 401.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid., p. 394.

19 Traces of this displacement appear (marked (\*)) in the following allusions to this Leibniz-facility. (1) *Philosophies of nature*: In an embryonic form in his “Einleitung” to “Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur als Einleitung in das Studium dieser Wissenschaft” (1797), in: *SWI*, 2, Stuttgart – Augsburg 1857, pp. 1-343 (gives the *Zusätze* of <sup>2</sup>1803 with the first edition text, with alterations in nn.; the “Einleitung” is sometimes separated from the

main text, as in Schröter's reprint and rearrangement of *SW: Schellings Werke*. Nach der Original-Ausgabe in neuer Anordnung hrsg. von M. Schröter, München 1927-1929, 1956-1960 (6 Bände und 6 Zusatzbände), here 54: "[...] das Einzelne konnte weder ohne das Ganze, noch das Ganze ohne das Einzelne *wirklich* werden". In "Von der Weltseele, eine Hypothese der höheren Physik zur Erklärung des allgemeinen Organismus" (1798), in: *SW I*, 2, pp. 345-583, each separate portion of matter is "für sich Abdruck des ganzen Universum", in which "die reine Wesentlichkeit selbst" can be recognised; without the corresponding finitude, the 'Wesentliche' could not be the 'Wesentliche'; there is an eternal union of infinite and finite, which he calls "das absolute Band, oder die Copula" (pp. 359-360). In "Allgemeine Deduktion des dynamischen Processes oder der Kategorien der Physik" (1800), in: *SW I*, 4, pp. 1-78 he expects that "die Natur, nachdem wir diesen allgemeinen Schlüssel gefunden haben, uns allmählich auch das Geheimniß ihrer einzelnen Operationen und der einzelnen Erscheinungen, welche den dynamischen Proceß begleiten, und welche doch alle nur Modificationen Einer Grunderscheinung sind, aufschließen werde" (p. 49). (2) *Works which see a reciprocal working between ideal and real*: In "System des transcendentalen Idealismus" (1800), in: *SW I*, 3, Stuttgart – Augsburg 1858, pp. 327-634 the process is: ideal→real, but it posits also a process real→ideal. This posits an original absolute act of human self-consciousness (pp. 388-389): outside time (pp. 396, 482), which precedes, and persists in, all individual acts: knowing (pp. 481-482), willing (p. 573), and acting: all men come together in (one) species; the act recapitulates everything into one absolute reality, constituting it. The all in one-ness and one in all-ness is true for each man (pp. 597-600; cf. "Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie" (1827?), in: *SW I*, 10, Stuttgart – Augsburg 1861, pp. 1-200, here 94). (3) *Complete systems of the absolute identity of real and ideal*: Schelling's use of the facility is here more extensive; the material of a philosophy of nature is more successfully brought within categories common to both (except in "Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie" (1801), in: *SW I*, 4, pp. 105-212, whose part in a philosophy of nature was truncated, and which, like *Fernere Darstellungen* (see note 11), lacks a corresponding ideal section). In the other works Schelling explained the data of space, time and gravity (having in mind Kepler, Newton and Leibniz) from his philosophy of absolute identity. His "Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie" posited the absolute as the single, true and total reality, in which everything existed in identity. Whilst it remained one itself, it was – in *ἐν καὶ πᾶν*-fashion – plurified within itself, by a branching out from its original division into ideal and real: "Das Wesen der absoluten Identität ist untheilbar" (§ 34 z 1, p. 130), but the ultimate division appears in its distinction between the 'Wesen' as under the forms of subjective real and objective ideal. Yet he wants their difference in all finite realities (expressed as  $A=B$ ) to be (\*) simultaneously an absolute equality (as  $A=A$ ) (§ 41 z, p. 133), and yet be relativised to the absolute – depicted as a line (§ 46, pp. 137-139). Here, in consequence of this finitude reduced to equality, the full identity of absolute and particular cannot be allowed: "Jedes einzelne Seyn ist als solches eine bestimmte Form des Seyns der absoluten Identität, nicht aber ihr Seyn selbst, welches nur in der Totalität ist" (§ 38, p. 131). However, he attributes this full identity to the potencies: "Die absolute Identität ist nur unter der Form aller Potenzen" (§§ 43-44, p. 135). Leibniz had posited a less rigorous identity than Schelling; yet for higher purposes, he and Hegel posited an identity of identity and non-identity. Because of the incompatibility of so many real factors, the task of establishing a convincing relationship was far greater than the classical theodicean task of identifying the multiplicity of compatible ideas in God. The essential passages for the rigorous identity of absolute and particulars in the elegant and comprehensive *Fernere Darstellungen* are given in the text itself; the *Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie*, as also the "System der gesammten Philosophie und der Naturphilosophie insbesondere" (1804), in: *SW I*, 6, Stuttgart – Augsburg 1860, pp. 131-576, were open for the absolute at least to be thought in separation. The latter (his Würzburg 1804-1805 course) is the most comprehensive of the three. Given as lectures, and bringing data from nature, thought, morality and art, into unity, demanded a

reality of the absolute had replaced the individual monads, their limited one-in-allness in knowing replaced by an unlimited one-in-allness in being.

### Other themes of Leibniz in Schelling's philosophy of nature

Already in the part on the philosophy of nature in the complete figures, other themes had arisen which touched on Leibniz's positions, and especially in Schelling's metaphysical interpretations of gravity and cohesion, light, space and time, in relation to absolute identity<sup>20</sup>. While he agreed with Leibniz's position that "[die] Trägheit der Materie das Beispiel einer ursprünglichen Unvollkommenheit [ist], einer ursprünglichen Privation in den geschaffenen

simplicity greater than the other two. Besides the printed version, there is a MS version (less polished) taken down by a listener ("Gesammte Philosophie"; Würzburg UB MS M ch q. 306), which has more references to Leibniz than the printed, polished version, though only one to the facility which he used: "Im Universum ist nichts leer, ungekannt oder todt. Jedem Theil der Materie ist die Totalität eingebildet; jeder ist ein ganzes, Leibniz sagt" (f. 46v°). Following the SW text, God is "*kraft der Selbstaffirmation seiner Idee absolutes All*" (§ 24, p. 174), and the course is a sustained meditation on its monistic reality, (\*) yet with a displacement: in itself, "das All" is the immediate consequence "der Idee Gottes"; the ideal and the real All must not be as  $A=A$ , for then "beide [ $A=A$  and  $A=B$ ] lösen sich [...] in der absoluten Identität und eben damit auch wechselseitig ineinander auf"; they are an enantiomorph of unequal potencies of dynamic 'Affirmierendes' (A) and static 'Affirmirtes' (B): the real being  $B=A$ , and the ideal  $A=B$ , with the affirmed preponderant in the real, and the affirming in the ideal (§§ 51-52, p. 208). The enantiomorph exists in a third potency where A and B "sich durchdringen und multipliciren" and are reduced "zum quantitativen Gleichgewicht" (§ 55 Erl., p. 210). The potencies belong exclusively to the appearance world, there, without absolute identity, they are "Nicht-Wesen" (§ 57, p. 211). Nevertheless there is a Leibniz-derived element expressed as: "In der Allheit sind [...] alle Formen [...], der Idee nach, in gleicher Absolutheit gesetzt" (§ 60, p. 212), even though things have differing degrees of approximation to it (§ 61, *ibid.*). Finally, this Würzburg MS includes (at the beginning) notes on a short, unpublished course (probably given before *Gesammte Philosophie*): "Einleitung in Naturphilosophie" (ff. 3r°-6v°): Philosophy alone is the science of the One, and alike of the All (f. 3r°-v°); and he expresses the facility given by Leibniz's monads in an equivalent form of ancient provenance: "Das Centrum wiederholt sich in allem Einzelnen" (f. 5r°).

- 20 Gravity as absolute identity of the forces of attraction and expansion (A and B): "Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie" (see note 19) § 54, p. 146. As such it conserves every relative ( $A=B$ ) product in its "Seyn", but this product needs light (whose reality is absolute identity: *ibid.* § 93, pp. 162-165) as the determinant to bring forth the relative totality (*ibid.* § 63 zz 1,2, p. 151; with "das erste Einschlagen des Lichts in die Schwerkraft auf empirischen Wege darzustellen als das erste Einschlagen des ideellen Princips in das reelle überhaupt": § 145 z 3, p. 205); cohesion can be represented as a line, at every point of which A and B as forces of attraction and expansion are in relative identity (*ibid.* § 67, p. 153), having the form of magnetism (*ibid.* § 68, p. 153). His "Fernere Darstellungen" (see note 11) sees the absolute as the reciprocal "Ineinsbildung" of its (finite) form in (infinite) "Wesen" (as ideal) and "Wesen" in form (as real; p. 417), with time derived from the former, and space from the latter; yet wholly undivided (p. 422). They come together into union through gravity (Schwere), which posits them together: "[...] das



Dingen”, that was only matter as mass: in itself indifferent to rest or movement, and “bloß Passives”: the sphere of dead mechanism. But all movement derives from the dilation of the absolute into space and time<sup>21</sup>: time as “die Offenbarung des All an dem besonderen Leben der Dinge”, “die Form des Beseeltheits der Dinge für ihr besonderes Leben”. The ideal of physicists – inevitably including Leibniz – to regard the universal order as reducible to passive determinations alone was “unmöglich”<sup>22</sup>. He was convinced that, to explain gravity, neither Newton’s conception of attraction (Anziehung) as a “qualitas occulta”, nor Kant’s of the opposed forces of attraction and repulsion, nor Leibniz’s of ‘impulsive thrust’: “Stoß”, were adequate to reverse the merely common-sense principle of ‘actio in distans repugnat’<sup>23</sup>. For Schelling the whole of space was occupied with the dilation of the absolute substance, mediating the forces which unite its contents, which, in it, are not distant from each other<sup>24</sup>; and each thing gravitates in relationship to the All by gravitating in relationship to the One, and in relationship to the One by gravitating in relationship to the All<sup>25</sup>. Gravity can be attributed to “*keinem einseitigen Causalverhältniß einer Masse zu einer andern Masse*”<sup>26</sup>; it arises from “die unerforschliche Tiefe der Natur selbst,

Setzende der dritten Dimension, worin, als dem Identischen der beiden Einheiten, die beiden ersten synthetisch werden, demnach das Realitäts-Bestimmende im Raum” (ibid., p. 428).

21 Cf. nn. 33, 35.

22 “System der gesamten Philosophie” (see note 19) §§ 86-89, pp. 242-249; MS version (see note 19) §§ 107<sup>1</sup>(so corrig.)-108, ff. 49r<sup>o</sup>-50r<sup>o</sup>. In MS, Schelling refers (“Bemerkungen” after § 79, ff. 40v<sup>o</sup>-41r<sup>o</sup> (no SW parallel)) to Leibniz’s use of Kepler’s (and Descartes’) “parfaite image” of inertia, being slowed down by “des imperfections et des inconveniens [...] dans la substance” (“Théodicée” § 30; GP VI, 119). He inferred a) the correctness of the scholastics’ privation: ‘causa ... deficiens’ as the cause of physical and moral evil, and that here (at least!: cf. at and in note 9) b) “Gott das unendliche in allen Dingen ist [...] Das reelle in allen Dingen wahr [sic!:=war] ihm Gott, das nicht reelle die Begränzung” – another reason “Leibniz nicht von Spinoza loszureißen”: see note 41, at and in note 48; cf. “Théodicée” § 380; GP VI, 341.

23 Whereas Leibniz denied the principle (“Specimen inventorum de admirandis naturae generalis arcanis” (c. 1686); GP VII, 309-318, here 317-318), Schelling’s conception of the omnipresence of absolute identity rendered it irrelevant and superfluous. Schelling regarded it as “ein Schande der wahren Philosophie” (MS “Gesamte Philosophie” (see note 19) § 115, f. 53r<sup>o</sup>); what takes place in the universe in a divine fashion cannot be understood mechanically (“System der gesamten Philosophie” (see note 19) § 95, p. 255). “Stoß” sees material as purely passive, without soul (cf. ibid. § 89 end, p. 249; MS version § 109 end, ff. 51r<sup>o</sup>-v<sup>o</sup>; “Stoß” and Leibniz: ibid. § 115, p. 52v<sup>o</sup>, cf. “System der gesamten Philosophie” § 95, p. 254).

24 Ibid. § 95, pp. 253-255. Leibniz is only mentioned by name in the MS version: § 115, ff. 52v<sup>o</sup>-53r<sup>o</sup>.

25 “System der gesamten Philosophie” (see note 19) § 95, p. 253; MS version § 115, f. 52v<sup>o</sup>: a mathematical relationship involving the square of the distance is irrelevant; MS § 118, f. 53v<sup>o</sup>, quotes Leibniz as saying that gravity varies according to the square of the distance; “System der gesamten Philosophie” § 98, pp. 257-258, corrects this to the inverse proportion of the square of the distance, attributing this to Newton.

26 Ibid. § 93 Folg., p. 252: attributed to Newton; MS version §§ 112-113, f. 52r<sup>o</sup>: attributed to Leibniz.

[which is] das mütterliche Princip der Dinge"<sup>27</sup>. Schelling's conception of absolute identity demanded the presence, in some way, of 'everything in everything', and he did not flinch from asserting in this work the consequence that "Alles im Universum ist beseelt"<sup>28</sup>. Accordingly, he is interested in Leibniz's approximations to this: every part of nature is a totality, like a garden<sup>29</sup>; "Leibniz mit Recht den Zustand der unorganischen Materie als den Schlafzustand der Materie bezeichnet": this entailed a continuity with other realities<sup>30</sup>; "die große Menge Lichtes, die nach Leibniz wie eine Chaterackt auf die Erde stürzt", indicates its material nature<sup>31</sup>. Schelling constructed a unity of time and space, of which these were dimensions, and in consequence one cannot say that the universe is either finite or infinite in time; time envisages things as abstracted from the All, in which each thing is eternal; the conception of "Dauer" sees them as belonging to a line: seeing them in "der [Dauer] einer Weltuhr", the "Urheber" is to accept that it will wear out and that he "selbst verbeßern, selbst repariren müßte", which Schelling attributes to Leibniz<sup>32</sup>. For Schelling, time and space are conjoint dilations of the identity and totality of the absolute: space of itself could not be a vacuum<sup>33</sup>; things are a metamorphosis<sup>34</sup> of the absolute,

27 Ibid. § 97 z, pp. 256-257; MS version § 117 z, f. 53v<sup>o</sup>.

28 Ibid. § 65, p. 217; MS version § 84, f. 42r<sup>o</sup>. But his conception of soul in nature includes sound, light, heat and fire: *ibid.* § 181, p. 370; MS version § 205, f. 77v<sup>o</sup>.

29 See "Monadologie" §§ 64-67; GP VI, 607-623, here 618: see MS "Gesammte Philosophie" (see note 19) § 99, f. 46v<sup>o</sup>; "System der gesammten Philosophie" (see note 19) § 79, pp. 231-232 (briefer, without reference to Leibniz).

30 *Ibid.*, before § 118 ("Oberste Grundsätze oder Axiome der Naturphilosophie" VIII), p. 280; the MS version: Axiom VIII (following § 142, f. 62r<sup>o</sup>) has a variant expression: "Die Natur als Einheit des äußern und innern Lebens träumt gleichsam im Schlafe, wie Leibniz sagt, so ungefähr, wie der Mensch Träume hat". A whole of which this is a part (but cf. note 51) is in "Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie" (see note 19), p. 54: bodies: sleeping monad world; souls of plants and animals: dreaming; rational soul: awake.

31 MS "Gesammte Philosophie" (see note 19) § 124,2, f. 55v<sup>o</sup>; the comparison and reference are dropped in "System der gesammten Philosophie" (see note 19) § 103: cf. penultimate paragraph, p. 264. H. Schepers suggests that "Lichtes [...] wie eine Chaterackt" could be an impromptu translation of "Fulgurations continuelles" – and, if so, a materialist correction ("Monadologie" § 47; GP VI, 614: cf. at and in nn. 48, 49).

32 In MS "Gesammte Philosophie" alone: § 142, f. 61r<sup>o</sup> (cf. (also § 141 with) "System der gesammten Philosophie" § 117, pp. 276-277).

33 Leibniz's position: see, e. g., 'Correspondence with Clarke' (1715-1716); GP VII, 345-440, here Leibniz's fourth letter §§ 7-11, pp. 372-373. Schelling argued that "Die [absolute] Substanz ist allgegenwärtig, es gibt keine Leere im Universum"; because "Alles ist Mittelpunkt", it is the universal mediator of activity and "Seyn", "die Identität in der Totalität und die Totalität in der Identität": "System der gesammten Philosophie" § 95 *Weit. Erl.*, pp. 254-255; MS version § 115, f. 52v<sup>o</sup>. "Der Raum ist [...] eine Totalität ohne Identität, wie die Zeit eine Identität ohne Totalität, aber eben deßhalb, weil nämlich alle wahre Totalität Identität ist, auch keine Totalität": "System der gesammten Philosophie" § 83, p. 239; MS version § 103, f. 48r<sup>o</sup>.

34 "System der gesammten Philosophie" § 133 z 3, p. 299; MS version § 158 z 3, f. 66v<sup>o</sup>.

by which they took on their own space and their own time<sup>35</sup>: the contrary to Leibniz's 'each thing does not have its own time, and it does not keep its own space'<sup>36</sup>. Schelling also made some generalisations about, and corrections to, Leibniz's position, as he understood it. He had re-activated Plato's teaching on ideas with an *identity* of God and every 'monas', and an *allness* of individual monads in pre-established harmony<sup>37</sup>. This pre-established harmony is an intermediary between subject and object; their identity would make it identical with his own position: "Die Realität aller Erkenntniß beruht darauf, daß es abs. Ein und dasselbe ist welches erkennt, und welches erkannt wird. Nehmen wir ein drittes an, das Subj. und Obj. vermittelte, so müßten wir mit Leibniz unsere Zuflucht zur praestabilirten Harmonie nehmen"<sup>38</sup>. But Leibniz gave the objective the same *nature* as the subjective; the consequent disappearance of their distinction made of the whole "ein *bewußtlos* Vorstellendes, *blind* Perceptives", which had lost its distinction of subject and object. This was the absolute opposite of Descartes' duality of thought and extension, whose complete distinction rendered mechanical the functioning of the whole. That this "Perceptives" was effected in a subject-object made it cognate to his own position, but in fact more like the subject-object in animal perception, on which instinct followed mechanically<sup>39</sup>.

- 35 "System der gesammten Philosophie" § 83 z, pp. 239-240: space is not a determination of the universe; dimensions are only a pure appearance of the absolute identity in a particular thing; MS version § 103 and z, ff. 47v<sup>o</sup>-48r<sup>o</sup>. On time: *ibid.* § 109 Allg. Refl., f. 51r<sup>o</sup>: "[...] die Zeit ist in den Dingen selbst, oder diese haben sie in sich"; "System der gesammten Philosophie" § 89, pp. 246-249. cf. also "Bruno oder über das göttliche und natürliche Princip der Dinge. Ein Gespräch" (1802), in: *SW* I, 4, pp. 213-332, here 251, 283; "Fernere Darstellungen" (see note 11), p. 389. Especially "Einleitung in die Philosophie" (Munich 1830 course; partly repeated 1836); Schelling: Berlin-Nachlaß MSS 108 I-VI, 109 I, II (quite unlike the text used for W. E. Ehrhardt (Hrsg.): *F. W. J. Schelling: Einleitung in die Philosophie* (= *Schellingiana* 1), Stuttgart – Bad Cannstatt 1989; also dated 1830, but clearly from Schelling's faulty memory, as this transcription has many signs of greater authenticity), here MS 109 I, f. 135, immo: "Alles hat seine Zeit und nur die Zeit, der jegliches Ding angehört".
- 36 'Correspondence with Clarke' (here Leibniz's fifth letter § 46); GP VII, 399. Leibniz's distinction between the extension of things and their space, and the duration of things and their time, according to which each has its own extension and duration, but not its own time and space, was not necessary for Schelling. Each thing was essentially identified with the timeless and spaceless absolute, and time and space were constituted by extension and duration as its dilations.
- 37 See "Geschichte der Ideenlehre", in: MS "Gesammte Philosophie" (see note 19), placed after § 47, f. 29v<sup>o</sup> (no *SW* parallel). Platonic ideas as in the  $\epsilon\nu\ \pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$  of Plotinus's  $\nu\omicron\varsigma$ : *Enn.* V 1, 8, especially VI 2, 20.
- 38 From the first of a supplementary formulation of 37 "Hauptsätze über Schelling's Natur Philosophie von ihm selbst dictirt", in MS "Gesammte Philosophie" itself (f. 11r<sup>o</sup>); but corresponding to § 1 neither in it, nor in "System der gesammten Philosophie" (see note 19).
- 39 *Ibid.* § 235, especially pp. 458-459; MS version § 261, ff. 91v<sup>o</sup>-92r<sup>o</sup> (which attributes all this to Leibniz). The knowing is blind because of the supposed spiritual identity of the presenting monad's nature and its presentations; a contrast is needed outside this identity. This explanation anticipates what he will later say about Leibniz's monads: cf. at nn. 48, 49.

However, Schelling's confident proliferation of figures of the absolute identity of real and ideal came to an unexpected end with its lampooning by Hegel – his supposed collaborator and friend – in his *Phänomenologie des Geistes* in 1807<sup>40</sup>. Deeply wounded, he made a fresh start; he published little more in his lifetime, though he lectured ceaselessly. His interest in the facility from Leibniz's *Monadologie* ceased therewith.

### Schelling's allusions to Leibniz after his new beginning

From his *Freiheit*-Schrift onwards, Leibniz appears to Schelling often as the anti-dualist, who considered the essence of *bodies* to be a confusion in the power of presentation of the monads themselves<sup>41</sup>. The logic of Leibniz's rational ordering of the monads was consistent with his conception of God, seen from inside a theodicy as falling under necessity, postulated from an axiomatic inner consistency of his action<sup>42</sup>. Though Leibniz's name is not always mentioned, Schelling proposed, against a philosophy with this logical necessity, an 'historical' philosophy<sup>43</sup>. Hence his interest in Leibniz's debate with Bayle on

40 Cf. "Philosophie der Offenbarung" (1841 ff.), in: *SW* Bd. II, 3 (= XIII), Stuttgart – Augsburg 1858, pp. 1-530 (I), *SW* II, 4 (= XIV), Stuttgart – Augsburg 1858, pp. 1-334 (II); here I, pp. 14-15.

41 See "Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände" (1809), in: *SW* I, 7, Stuttgart – Augsburg 1860, pp. 331-416, here 356 (together with Spinoza's system, "nicht einen lebendigen Realismus zur Basis erhält"); "Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen" (1810), in: *SW* I, 7, pp. 417-484, here 443-444; "Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie" (1842-1852?), in: *SW* II, 1 (= XI), Stuttgart – Augsburg 1856, here pp. 425-426; "Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie" (see note 19), pp. 48-54 (the principle place): "Leibniz sagt: Sowohl das, was wir das Ausgedehnte als das, was wir Denkende nennen, – beides ist an sich nur geistige Substanz" (p. 48).

42 E. g. of God's necessity: "*Il n'existe point, parce qu'il veut exister, mais par la nécessité de sa nature infinie*" ("Théodicée" § 183; *GP* VI, 224); and "Ainsi Dieu seul (ou l'Être Necessaire) a ce privilege, qu'il faut qu'il existe, s'il est possible" ("Monadologie" § 45; *GP* VI, 614); cf. "Specimen inventorum de admirandis naturae generalis arcanis" (see note 23): "Ens necessarium, si modo possibile est, utique existit" (*GP* VII, 310). Of the state of the world: "Mundus enim praesens physice seu hypothetice, non vero absolute seu Metaphysice est necessarius. [Sed] ultima radix debet esse in aliquo, quod sit Metaphysicae necessitatis [...]" ("De rerum originatione radicali" (1697); *GP* VII, 302-308, here 303). For Schelling, God's "a se esse" entailed no inner necessity, because it was 'sponte': "ohne Grund" ("Grundlegung der positiven Philosophie, Münchner Vorlesung WS 1832/33 und SS 1833", in: H. Fuhrmans (Hrsg.): *Philosophica varia inedita vel rariora* 3.1 (3.2: notes, never published), Torino 1972, p. 127).

43 "Geschichtlich": of what is "geschehen". Schelling: a pure "Denknotwendigkeit" produces a "nichtwissendes Wissen": *ibid.*, pp. 95-96 (cf. *ibid.*, p. 96: Wolff's systematisation of Leibniz's fragmented philosophy had only "die geistvolle Leibnizische Philosophie entgeistet"). The search for a "geschichtliches" system is ancient, and preceded "die objektiv-logischen Systeme", and is part of a striving for a higher *positive* science (*ibid.*, p. 100). See especially his "Philosophie der Offenbarung" I (see note 40), p. 317: "Ich

God's freedom and the source of evil in his *Théodicée* (1710); hence, too, his own different positions, that God wills freely without choosing, and, elsewhere, finding an impregnable condition for a truly free will, in a will which wills absolutely nothing<sup>44</sup>, and finally within a philosophy which began with the historical processes of theogony and cosmogony, interpreted as the outcome of the free interplay of the same potencies of universal efficacy<sup>45</sup> presiding over the emergence of (even evil) possibilities<sup>46</sup>.

In his Munich lectures, entitled by his editor *Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie* (circa 1827), which counts as his verdict on philosophers since

werde übrigens in der nun folgenden Auseinandersetzung nicht bloß die philosophische Nothwendigkeit zeigen, sondern das auf dem Weg der philosophischen Folgerung Gefundene immer auch sogleich geschichtlich, und zwar urkundlich, nämlich in den Urkunden der Offenbarung, nachweisen".

- 44 "An sich ist nur das Ewige, auf sich selbst Beruhende, Wille, Freiheit. [...] nur das Freie, und soweit es frei ist, in Gott ist [...]" ("Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit" (see note 41), p. 347). (Cf. pp. 396-398: "In der nur zu sehr vom Geist der Abstraktion beherrschten Leibnizischen Philosophie ist die Anerkennung der Naturgesetze als sittlich-, nicht aber geometrisch-nothwendiger, und ebensowenig willkürlicher Gesetze, eine der erfreulichsten Seiten". He quotes (and translates) Leibniz's "Théodicée" § 345; GP VI, 319: "Daher sind diese Gesetze der Beweis eines höchsten, intelligenten und freien Wesens gegen das System absoluter Nothwendigkeit".) God wills without choice because His absolute freedom is at the same time absolute necessity. If God were to choose from among an infinite number of possibilities to make the best of all possible worlds (as Leibniz had supposed), he would have the lowest degree of freedom: "Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen" (see note 41), p. 429. Non-willing as the state of eternity, also a human aspiration: "Die Weltalter" (1811?), in: SW I, 8, Stuttgart – Augsburg 1861, pp. 195-344, here 235-236; "Ein solcher Wille ist nichts und ist Alles" ("Die Weltalter" (Druck I, 1811), in: *Schellings Werke*. Nach der Original-Ausgabe in neuer Anordnung hrsg. von M. Schröter (see note 19), *Nachlaßband (Die Weltalter, Fragmente)*, München 1966, p. 15); "ein lauterer Wille überhaupt [...] sey der Wille der nichts will" ("Die Weltalter" (Druck II, 1813), in: *ibid.*, p. 132 (this volume contains four fragments of other versions, of which Druck I and II are printer's proofs originally published by Schröter in Munich, 1946 – in Druck I and II, this will is paired with another will). Leibniz had conceived of such: "Une simple volonté sans aucun motif (*a mere will*) est une fiction [...]" ('Correspondence with Clarke' (here Leibniz's fourth letter § 2); GP VII, 371).
- 45 "[D]er *absolute* Proceß" among the potencies: "Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie" (see note 41), p. 217. That the potencies' processes in mythology are the same as in nature, and of his philosophy of mythology as a valid example for all sciences, see "Philosophie der Mythologie" (1842 ff.), in: SW II, 2 (= XII), Stuttgart – Augsburg 1857, pp. 1-674, here 670-674. Potency A is 'rein Seynkönnendes': it retains its force and position so long as it does not realise itself as (deviant, evil) B. If it does, A reemerges (now as A<sup>2</sup>, its former state being designated A<sup>1</sup>) to reduce B back to this (in a free, undetermined contest), with their ultimate equilibrium as A<sup>3</sup>: seen together as A<sup>1</sup>A<sup>2</sup>A<sup>3</sup>; though A<sup>1</sup> can be expressed as (A-B). The basic interplay is between -A: 'nicht Seyendes' and pure subject; +A its objectification as 'rein Seyendes'; ±A their equilibrium: seen together as -A+A±A. See "Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie", pp. 390-391.
- 46 Cf. "Philosophie der Mythologie" (see note 45), p. 439: research the possibilities, then see whether there is a corresponding reality; and *ibid.*, p. 526: the 'Weltgeist' fulfils all true possibilities.

Descartes, Schelling found the contrast so great between Leibniz's monadology: not only the *Monadologie* itself, but the evidence from his correspondence about his characterisation of matter as phenomenon<sup>47</sup>, and his other writings, and especially his *Théodicée*, as to need a new interpretation. Schelling's realism reacted against Leibniz's position, which he had brought into a simplicity and unity which went beyond the latter's privately expressed phenomenalism, as to deny any duality of body and "Geist". Not only were the 'Vorstellungen' of Leibniz's monads spiritual (geistig), but their accompanying bodies as well: therefore "Nur dasjenige Ist, was vorstellt"; Leibniz was "ein absoluter Unitarier [...]. Er kennt nichts als Geist". He was therefore no advance on Spinoza<sup>48</sup>, because God, as the primal monad, is a single substance, the other monads being its fulgurations, just as things were logical emanations for Spinoza<sup>49</sup>. Leibniz's *Théodicée* was a review of discussions on the justice of God in relationship to the freedom of man, and on the origin of evil, which he had discussed in earlier shorter writings. He displayed himself there as an expert scholar: a proponent of a coherent solution, and a judicious analysis of others'. The figure of natural philosophy within it was that of material substances and predication, with an incompletely separated soul and body related by a predetermined harmony<sup>50</sup>. With all of this Schelling felt more at ease, and he judged not that Leibniz had been inconsistent, but, more complementarily, that his monadology had been a genial pastime<sup>51</sup>:

47 See note 1.

48 "Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie" (see note 19), pp. 49-50; repeated in "Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie" (see note 41), p. 425, together with echoes of the same idea: "Ein Körper ist [...] ein zusammengeronnenes geistiges Wesen".

49 "Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie" (see note 19), p. 51.

50 Cf. "Théodicée" § 59; GP VI, 135: He accepted a metaphysical communication which "fait, que l'ame et le corps composent un même *suppôt*". He acknowledged the reality of appearances (§ 124; GP VI, 178-179), that "Aussitôt qu'il y a un mélange de pensées confuses, voilà les sens, voilà la matière [...] il n'y a point de Creature raisonnable sans quelque corps organique, et qu'il n'y a point d'esprit créé qui soit entièrement détaché de la matière". Cf., also, "Théodicée" §§ 64, 130, 291, 300; GP VI, 137-138, 182-183, 289-290, 295-296.

51 He has good words to say about "Principes de la nature et de la grace, fondés en raison"; GP VI, 598-606: see "Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie" (see note 19), p. 54, referring to it under the title *Theses in gratiam principis Eugenii*. The description of the world of inorganic bodies as a sleeping-monad-world, that of plants and animals as dreaming, and the reasonable soul as awake, (\*) was "der erste Anfang, das Eine Wesen der Natur in der nothwendigen Stufenfolge seines zu-sich-selbst-Kommens zu betrachten, und kann insofern gelten als der erste Keim späterer, lebendigerer Entwicklung. Diese Seite ist noch die schönste und beste der Leibnizischen Lehre; von dieser Seite vorzüglich ist sie dargestellt in den bekannten Thesibus" (ibid.). Schelling does not here interpret the material world as "Vorstellkraft" as he does in the same passage, drawing on the *Monadologie*. – (\*) The origin of this precise formulation does not come to light, so we must provisionally conclude that it is a reformulation in a tradition of Leibniz interpretation, possibly based on "Monadologie" §§ 19-24; GP VI, 610-611 (H. Breger and H. Schepers).

“Sollte ich darüber eine Meinung äußern, so wäre ich eher geneigt anzunehmen, daß Leibniz seine Monadologie als einen bloßen *lusus ingenii* betrachtet habe, die er nur den Vorstellungen anderer gleichzeitiger oder ihm vorangegangener Philosophen entgegenstellte, und daß es ihm vielmehr mit der *Theodicee* Ernst gewesen. Leibniz war ein viel zu erfahrener von der einen und ein zu genialer Mann auf der andern Seite, als daß er selbst seine Monadenlehre für etwas mehr als eine bloß vorübergehende Vorstellung hätte halten können”<sup>52</sup>.

But Leibniz himself had added the cross-references from the *Theodicee* to paragraphs in a manuscript of his *Monadologie*<sup>53</sup>, which demonstrates that it was, in part, an extension of his previous thought. There are other themes in the *Theodicee* which are relatable to deeper speculative themes in Schelling, of which he must have taken note; we list some of these in a note<sup>54</sup>.

- 52 “Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie” (see note 19), p. 56. A position subsequently reversed in his “Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie” (see note 41), pp. 278-279. By then Schelling had changed his mind about a letter in which Leibniz said that the *Theodicee* was written “de tout diriger à l’edification”, which he had previously considered to be unreliable, stemming from “ein, freilich wegen seiner großen Eitelkeit wenig glaubwürdiger Mann” (“Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie”, p. 56). This refers to the letter to Remond (see note 1; see “Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie”, p. 279, n. 1). But Schelling’s taking this as later self-criticism (“das darin enthaltene System [konnte] einen so allbefähigten Geist allerdings nicht befriedigen”) is exaggerated. Leibniz intended “edification” in its original, not a trivializing, sense: “Outre que j’ay eu soin de tout diriger à l’edification, j’ay taché de deterrer et de reunir la verité ensevelie et dissipée sous les opinions des differentes Sectes des Philosophes [...]” (letter to Remond; GP III, 606).
- 53 He did this himself on a fair copy of the original much corrected MS, made by someone else: H. Breger.
- 54 Leibniz’s reference to “la grande Question *du Libre et du Necessaire*” (“*Theodicee*”, Preface; GP VI, 29) in that form is probably an allusion to Ralph Cudworth’s, *The True Intellectual System of the Universe* (London 1678; cf. “*Theodicee*”, Preface; GP VI, 40). Cf. Cudworth’s “Preface” (beginning: A3.1r°): “[...] I intended onely a Discourse concerning Liberty and Necessity [...], Against the Fatall Necessity of all Actions and Events [...]”. Both Leibniz and Schelling were appreciative of Cudworth; see Leibniz, GP III, 336-343; cf. Grua I, 327. In Schelling, besides two direct allusions to Mosheim’s Latin translation (“Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie” (see note 41), pp. 27, 85), there are innumerable points of contact with his later thought. His “Geschichte des Gnosticismus” (1795 (-1796?)) (\*) lists it (f. 168) in his basic bibliography; the anonymous Greek transcription (ibid., ff. 170-171), actually from Plutarch’s *De Iside et Osiride* (§§ 45-46, 369B-E), was transcribed from Mosheim’s Latin translation (evidence from a *hapax*), showing he studied it carefully. For Schelling a ‘logical’ philosophy subjected God to an unwarranted necessity; a ‘geschichtliche’ philosophy respected his freedom. Leibniz’s “*Verités [...] Positives*” which we know *a posteriori* (“*Theodicee*”, Discours preliminaire § 2; GP VI, 50) allude to what Schelling took up in his later positive philosophy. Leibniz was radical in describing freedom as “combattue (en apparence) par la determination ou par la certitude, quelle qu’elle soit” (“*Theodicee*” § 2; GP VI, 102; cf. LH IV, 8, 74-77 (*Épître sur la liberté*, c. 1689)); a solution of Schelling, equally radical, was to identify it with a total absence of willing (see at and in note 44). Leibniz speculated on the origin of evil: “[...] il y a une *imperfection originale dans la creature* avant le peché, parceque la creature est limitée essentiellement” (“*Theodicee*” § 20; GP VI, 115); Schelling’s later potency theories gave a place for it in their free interplay; his transcrip-

Schelling's later work<sup>55</sup>, and especially his positive philosophy<sup>56</sup>, provided, in isolated passages, a metaphysical scale to what could not be allowed to remain purely formal. That he always kept Leibniz in mind is manifest from the fact that in what was virtually his last work, *Abhandlung über die Quelle der ewigen Wahrheiten* (a lecture given in Berlin in 1850), he took up a problematic of Leibniz, alluding in the title to the context in his *Théodicée*. Leibniz, he said, had distinguished between the divine will as the cause of reality, and the divine "*Verstand*" as the cause of possibility, which is to say their ideality; the latter

tion of Plutarch (cf. *supra*) located the cause of evil in nature itself. Leibniz located all possibilities in God ("Théodicée" §§ 21, 52; GP VI, 115, 131) – more realistic than Kant's 'Inbegriff aller Möglichkeiten', and this was a feature of Schelling's later conception of 'Seynkönnende'. Leibniz said that God wills *consequenter* "le meilleur" ("Théodicée" § 23; GP VI, 116), and Schelling found the same in Plato, adding that this "zugleich ein überwundenes Gegentheil begreift. [Or, as cause of the good alone,] Gott selbst hat weiter nichts zu thun" ("Darstellung des philosophischen Empirismus" (1830), in: *SW I*, 10, Stuttgart – Augsburg 1861, pp. 225-286, here 254-255). With his later triad of principles, Schelling would have been very sympathetic to Leibniz's remark ("Théodicée" § 145; GP VI, 195-196) that nature must be explained, not by one principle, but by two; and that these in God ("son Entendement et sa Volonté") are preceded by a third, "la puissance" ("Théodicée" § 149; GP VI, 198-199), which he named together "les trois primordialités" ("Théodicée" § 150; GP VI, 199). But Schelling set himself against Leibniz's principle, "Le vray Dieu est toujours le même" ("Théodicée" § 177; GP VI, 220): God raises himself, with complete freedom, to the highest, but not within a process which would import an alien logical element ("Grundlegung der positiven Philosophie" (see note 42), p. 215); by pure willing to be "rein Seyende" as identical with the "seyn Könnende" ("Philosophie der Offenbarung" I (see note 40), pp. 221-222). As also against God's acting under moral necessity ("Théodicée" § 201; GP VI, 236-237; cf. "Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie" (see note 19), p. 58). He would have found the interaction of the potencies adumbrated in Leibniz's "aussitost que Dieu a decerné de créer quelque chose, il y a un combat entre tous les possibles, tous prétendants à l'existence" ("Théodicée" § 201; GP VI, 236). Where Leibniz said that the origin of evil is "*dans la liberté des creatures*" ("Théodicée" § 273; GP VI, 280), Schelling asserted, with more Christian orthodoxy, that it lay in Adam's willing to usurp God's place ("Philosophie der Offenbarung" I, pp. 348-354). Here, that Schelling quotes the same two texts together (2 *Peter* 2, 4 and *Jude* 5, 6) in his "Philosophie der Offenbarung" II (see note 40), pp. 288-290, as Leibniz ("Théodicée" § 273; GP VI, 280), under the same topic, that the angels did not keep their place, cannot be a coincidence. (\*) Schelling: Berlin-Nachlaß MS 28, ff. 166-306 (unpublished) – I numbered the folios consecutively (as pages, ignoring v° and r°) from the inside of the front cover, in its present condition, as 1. Schelling had inverted the note-book, already used, before beginning this work.

- 55 From this generalisation of 'later' we except the conceptual framework of his early "System der gesammten Philosophie", with its *positive* categorisations of 'Affirmierendes' and 'Affirmirtes' (see note 19). In it (§ 305 Ansicht, p. 545; MS version § 336, f. 104r°, does not reach so far) he quotes the *Théodicée*: "Gott nur das Positive der Dinge emanire"; cf. "Théodicée" § 31; GP VI, 121: "[...] Dieu donne toujours à la creature, et produit continuellement ce qu'il y a en elle de positif, de bon et de parfait [...]".
- 56 Positive philosophy started from the primary dynamic communication of being; negative philosophy provided the subsequent conceptual structures for it. For Schelling, most philosophy took place in the latter, oblivious of its dependence on the former; cf. note 62.



included evil, not imputable to the divine will<sup>57</sup>. But his conception needed expansion. If God is “*reine Wirklichkeit*” and without potency, “das All der Möglichkeit ewiger Weise” in Him will not be capable of being ‘selbst-Seyn’; possibilities are “nicht-Seyende”, God is ‘selbst-Seyendes’; He is “actus purus” to it: as pure “*Daß*” (= that (it is)) corresponding to its universal “*Was*” (= what): yet also needing to be “*Etwas*” in order to be, and here to be the ‘alles-Seyende’, as also to be related to thinking (Denken): “[...] nicht zu einem *Begriff*, aber zum *Begriff aller Begriffe*, zur *Idee*. Hier ist die wahre Stelle für jene Einheit des Seyns und des Denkens [...]”, in which “das Seyn ist das Erste, das Denken erst das Zweite oder Folgende”<sup>58</sup>. In his deviate reflections, Leibniz had consistently given a priority to thought or its analogues.

To give briefly Schelling’s final position in more detail: he saw God as “das Seyende”, in  $\epsilon\nu\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$ -unity with it; yet he also wanted God to be more exactly understood as distinguishable from it: not only “aus der Vernunft [...]”

57 “Abhandlung über die Quelle der ewigen Wahrheiten” (1850), in: *SW* II, 1 (= XI), pp. 573-590, here 581-584. This is in the first part of a quotation from “*Théodicée*” § 184; *GP* VI, 226-227, of which these words are filled out with the substance from other places (e. g. §§ 7, 20, 149, 186, 205, 309, 335-336, 381; *GP* VI, 106-107, 114-115, 198-199, 227-228, 239-240, 299-300, 313-314, 341-342) in order to make the contrast, and the separation of divine will from intelligence (“Abhandlung über die Quelle der ewigen Wahrheiten”, pp. 581-582). He intended to break up any simple, deceptive and untrue, identities between the single ‘Wesen’ and the many. The context was the relationship between timeless truth and contingency, and the related difference between the universality and necessity in things, and their simultaneous contingency and reality, and therefore the nature of possibility (*ibid.*, pp. 584-585). He then refers (p. 582) to Leibniz’s “*De rerum originatione radicali*” (see note 42), p. 305, which preceded his *Théodicée*: “*Ultima ratio tam essentiarum quam existentiarum in Uno [...]*” (slightly adapted by Schelling); from the composite quotation from his *Théodicée*, some sciences (though not philosophy) could be unaware of this origin. So Schelling proposed a middle way between a total independence of things from God, and their total subjection to an arbitrary divine will, which would not, like Leibniz, locate the source of evil in the ideal nature of things. He also avoided Leibniz’s use of an old distinction between God’s antecedent and consequent willing (cf. note 58).

58 “Abhandlung über die Quelle der ewigen Wahrheiten” (see note 57), pp. 584-589. Schelling had implicitly referred (from p. 521 onwards) to Leibniz’s solution which distinguishes between God’s antecedent and consequent willing (“*Théodicée*” § 22; *GP* VI, 115-116). (The distinction is in Thomas Aquinas (*Summ. Th.* I 19, 6 ad 1), drawn from John Damascene (“*De orthodoxa fide*” II 29; *Patrologia Graeca* 94, 968).) Note the reference there to the “*verités éternelles [...]* cette *Region* immense” (“*Théodicée*” § 21; *GP* VI, 115), which occasioned Schelling’s title (cf., also, “*Monadologie*” §§ 43-46; *GP* VI, 614). His concern was the relationship between the timeless, eternal truths and the emergence of contingent realities which had been no more than possibilities, but which would constitute the ‘alles-Seyende’. The postulation of two willings in God created the impression that, in order to preserve God’s freedom, the consequent willing overrode the antecedent. For Schelling, God was the activator of the  $\epsilon\nu\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$ -reality, which, in itself, was the single realisation of an infinitude of possibilities; yet He was so united with it that it was the being, without which – per impossibile – He would be incomplete. Basically there was only one activator in one activation, to understand Whom, as the ‘Wesen’ within all ‘Wesen’, needed no human distinction between two willings.

befreit, aus der Idee ausgestoßen”, but as now “was das Seyende ist”, though not to the point of being divided from it, with “das Seyende”: “[...] nicht mehr ihm vorausgehen, es muß ihm also nachfolgen [...]”<sup>59</sup>. From within the ‘Vernunft’, God is the culminating point of rational philosophy<sup>60</sup>; but only outside of it, as “*Herr des Seyns*” and attained by an act of will<sup>61</sup>, can He be correctly appreciated, and become the principle of an historical philosophy which is positive<sup>62</sup>. On this ground, he could not agree with the opinion attributed to Leibniz (perhaps on the grounds of the monad’s knowledge of God, and through God of all the others), that God is the single, immediate object of the soul’s knowledge<sup>63</sup>. Of this knowledge, Schelling had formulated the conception that “*die Seele weiß nicht, sondern sie ist die Wissenschaft*” in an aesthetic

- 59 “[...] eine *Umkehrung* des bisherigen Verhältnisses zwischen dem was das Seyende ist (A°) und dem Seyenden (-A+A±A)” (cf. note 45). As the “*letzte Krisis der Vernunftwissenschaft*”, “[e]in *Wille* muß es seyn, von dem die Ausstoßung A°’s aus der Vernunft [...] ausgeht, ein *Wille*, der mit innerer Nothwendigkeit verlangt, daß Gott nicht bloße Idee sey” (“*Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie*” (see note 41), p. 565). “A° [...] als das ganz Idee-Freie ist [...] reines Daß [...]]. Dieses aber ist die Stellung, die es in der Wirklichkeit haben muß. Denn A° ist nicht, weil -A+A±A ist, sondern umgekehrt, -A+A±A ist, weil A° ist (wiewohl dieses nicht *Ist*, ohne das Seyende zu seyn)” (ibid. p. 570). A had the capacity of becoming [“seyn könnend”] B, as an objectification. It had also a subjective freedom, in that it could take on the form of a series of “alternative Glieder”, i. e. potencies, A<sup>1</sup>A<sup>2</sup>A<sup>3</sup>. At the end of a process, A°, now appearing as reestablished and designated as (A°), does not will to be realised as “+A° (das nicht freye)”: the ‘Seynkönnende’ which has lost its previous potentiality and thereby its freedom; but to return to what it was: “+A° als das freye und an nichts gebundene als A°=A<sup>1</sup>,A<sup>2</sup>,A<sup>3</sup>” (“*Fragment einer Abhandlung zur Strukturtheorie des Absoluten*” (after 1832/33), in: B. Loer: *Das Absolute und die Wirklichkeit in Schellings Philosophie. Mit der Erstedition einer Handschrift aus dem Berliner Schelling-Nachlaß (= Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie 7)*, Berlin 1974, pp. 29-69, here 50-52).
- 60 “*Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie*” (see note 41), p. 565. Cf. also “*Philosophie der Offenbarung*” I (see note 40), p. 156: Leibniz had sought by irrefutable syllogisms to arrive at God, conceived as “*Deus est Ens, ex cuius essentia sequitur existentia*”; but he reaches no further than “*Gott, wenn er existirt, das a priori, Existirende seyn muß*”.
- 61 “*Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie*” (see note 41), pp. 566-567: “[...] das Ich [kann] sich nicht selbst den Beruf zuschreiben ihn zu gewinnen, Gott muß mit seiner Hülfe *entgegenkommen* [...], aber es kann ihn *wollen*, und hoffen, durch ihn einer Seligkeit theilhaftig zu werden [...]”.
- 62 Cf. ibid., p. 571. The end of rational (= negative) philosophy is a concept of God, but one cannot go from this concept to prove God’s existence: the concept must be abandoned. But one can go from the being (Seyn) of God to his conceived reality (Wesen), as containing His potencies – in a positive philosophy – as from something incontrovertibly and undoubtedly certain: “*Philosophie der Offenbarung*” I (see note 40), p. 159. Cf. note 56.
- 63 “*Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie*” (see note 41), p. 516: it was possible for the soul in its original relationship (Urverhältnis) to God, but not in its present condition: “*mit ins Reich des Physisch-materiellen gezogene[r] Seele*”. Perhaps an extension of what Leibniz says of God as the source of the monads’ knowledge: “*Monadologie*” §§ 43-47; GP VI, 614.

context<sup>64</sup>, and found it later, not in Aristotle's passive intellect, but in what Aristotle called "*eine andere Art von Seele*"; in any case, unlike Leibniz's monad<sup>65</sup>. By comparison, the intellect (Verstand) is "freithätig"<sup>66</sup>, and, "bloß materiell genommen schon ganz in der Seele"<sup>67</sup>. Because the soul has undisputed anterior knowledge, Leibniz's position that the intellect was outside it, was "ganz unpassend"<sup>68</sup>. Schelling's conception of the soul as itself being science, with a natural initial continuity and familiarity with the 'Seyende', was critical of Leibniz's ideal of explaining what it must stand outside of<sup>69</sup>, in purely rational terms (yet it was superior to Wolff's development of it<sup>70</sup>). In consequence, his position was a subjective rationalism<sup>71</sup>, whose subjectivism showed itself in its tempering the necessity of God's action to a moral necessity. It was also "der letzte Halt des Rationalismus"; and because of its subjectivism and its contradictory logicism, "er sich bloß dem Positiven der geoffenbarten Religion entgegenstellt, eigentlich allem Positiven auch in der Philosophie entgegen ist"<sup>72</sup>.

In passing, Schelling also touched critically on other unconnected matters<sup>73</sup>. He made a number of general judgements on Leibniz<sup>74</sup>, which need care

64 "Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie" (see note 41), p. 519 (cf. *Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling. Das Tagebuch 1848. Rationale Philosophie und demokratische Revolution*. Mit A. v. Pechmann und M. Schraven aus dem Berliner Nachlaß hrsg. von H. J. Sandkühler (= *Philosophische Bibliothek* 367), Hamburg 1990, p. 201: "[...] unabhängig von Aristoteles [...]"): referring to "Über das Verhältnis der bildenden Künste zu der Natur" (1807), in: *SW I*, 7, Stuttgart – Augsburg 1860, pp. 289-329, here 312. But note the qualification: "Die Seele ist [...] beschäftigt [...] nur mit dem Geist, als dem Leben der Dinge" (*ibid.*).

65 "Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie" (see note 41), p. 453-455. He came to this conclusion from another distinction of Aristotle, that, as first entelechy, the intellectual soul is "wie Wissenschaft", but not "wie [...] Wissenschaft-erzeugend [...]" (θεωρεῖν) (p. 453). This was quite unlike Leibniz's "'dominierende[r]' Monade" (p. 454).

66 *Ibid.*, p. 453.

67 *Ibid.*, p. 519.

68 He refers to Leibniz's exclusion of it: "excepto ipso intellectu" (*ibid.*).

69 "Grundlegung der positiven Philosophie" (see note 42), p. 161.

70 *Ibid.*, p. 160.

71 I. e. without the construction of a corresponding object; *ibid.*, p. 162: "Jene Philosophie kann nicht eine dogmatische, sondern nur eine subjektiv-rationalistische Philosophie heißen: Denn das Wort 'Dogma' setzt eine positive Bedeutung voraus".

72 *Ibid.*, p. 158.

73 See his critique of Leibniz's use of a Socinian's conception of the Trinity (see "Defensio trinitatis"; *GP IV*, 111-125, here 123-124): "Philosophie der Offenbarung" I (see note 40), p. 315; his interpretation of the passage from the realm of nature, "wie Leibniz sagt, d. h. vom Reich der Nothwendigkeit", to the realm of grace ("Philosophie der Offenbarung" II (see note 40), p. 17). He much approved of Leibniz for writing of God as "*l'Être absolu*", rather than "das vollkommenste, oder gar: das unendliche Wesen" ("Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie" (see note 41), p. 279 and n. 2).

74 E. g. "Spinoza [hat] reiner die Idee der Philosophie gehalten als Leibniz" ("Einleitung in Naturphilosophie" (see note 19), f. 6r); Leibniz's philosophy was 'geistvoll' (but Wolff's

in quoting, because Schelling could be, in the same passage, incisively critical in detail, and magnanimous in general.

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systematisation of it had destroyed that quality; “Grundlegung der positiven Philosophie” (see note 43), p. 96); Spinoza was too objective, Leibniz too subjective, resulting in Kant’s ‘unerklärtem Dualismus’ (ibid., pp. 173-174). The longest is the section on Leibniz (seen with the sections on Spinoza and Wolff) in “Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie” (see note 19), especially pp. 58-59: “Es mag scheinen, daß unser Urtheil über Leibniz im ganzen nicht sehr günstig gelautet. Dieses Urtheil kann jedoch dem wahren Geiste des Mannes keinen Eintrag thun”; and pp. 59-60: Leibniz ‘beschwichigt’ post-Descartes revolutionary philosophy, and opposed Spinoza’s objective with subjective rationalism.